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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES B. JOHNSTON,
Plaintiff,
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vs.

CASE NO. 16859

MAUREEN H. SIMPSON and WAYNE
SIMPSON, dba The Flight
School,
Defendants,
Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF
DEFENDANTS, APPELLANTS

Frank s. Warner
WARNER, MARQUARDT & HASENYAGER
543 - 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Attorney for Defendants,
Appellants.
John T. Anderson
ROE AND FOWLER
340 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff,
Respondent.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES B. JOHNSTON,
Plaintiff,
Respondent.

vs.
MAUREEN H. SIMPSON and WAYNE
SIMPSON, dba The Flight
School,

Case No. 16859

Defendants,
Appellants.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY SUPPORTS THE VIEW THAT THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ACT DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE LAW IN DETERMINING
PRIORITY OF INTERESTS IN AIRCRAFT.
The Respondent (Plaintiff below) primarily relies
upon Dowell v. Beach Acceptance Corp., 3 Cal.3d 544, 91
Cal. Rptr. 1, 476 P.2d 401 (1970) for the proposition that
the Federal Aviation Act in providing for the registration
of documents affecting the title to or any interest in civil
aircraft in the United States preempts state law and is the
sole determining factor in determining priority of interests
-1Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

in aircraft.

Dowell specifically so holds.

Dowell was the first

case to squarely face the preemption question and hold in
favor of the development of federal priorities.
Louis Univ. L.J. 122 at 134.
criticized.

19 St.

Dowell has been soundly

19 St. Louis Univ. L. J. 122; Bitzer Croft

Motors v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, 401 N.E. 2d 1340
(Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways
Enterprises, 580

s.w.

2d 491 (Ken. 1979); Bank of

Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club, 571 S.W. 2d
152 (Ct. App. Tenn 1977).

Only one case has been found

which follows Dowell and that was an intermediate appellate
court decision in Florida.

O'Neill v. Barnett Bank

360 So.2d 150 (Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 1978).

A sister division

of the same court subsequently refused to follow that case.
Michigan National Bank v. Maierhoffer, 382 So.2d 318 (Dist.
Ct. App. Fla. 1979).

All other cases subsequent to Dowell

dealing with this issue appear to have held that the Federal
Aviation Act does not preempt state law dealing with the
issue of priorities among competing interests in aircraft.
Bitzer Croft Motors v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, supra;
Cessna Finance Corp. v. Skyways Enterprises, supra;
Bank of Hendersonville v. Red Baron Flying Club, supra;
Michigan National Bank v. Maierhoffer, supra.

Thus the

Kentucky Supreme Court in Cessna Finance Corp., holds:
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Cessna Finance contends that the Federal
Aviation Act, 49 u.s.c. Sec. 1403, preempts
all state laws governing priorities among perfected security interests. we do not agree.
The purpose of Congress in enacting the
Federal Aviation Act was to establish a
single national filing system for the
recording of documents evidencing title and
security interests in pivil aircraft and not
to legislate priorities among holders of
various interests in aircraft. H.R.
Rep. No.
2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., Reprinted in
{1958) u. s. Code & Admin.
News, pp. 3741,
3750, 3755; H.R. Rep. No. 9738, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess., 405-407 {1938). E. g., Henson, Secured
Transactions 22 {1979). Congress did not
intend to supercede state laws that would
otherwise govern the priorities between perfected security interests. Haynes v. General
Elec. Credit Corp., W.D.Va., 432 F.Supp. 763,
765-767 {1977), Affirmed C.A.4th, 582 F.2d 869
{per curiam); Sanders v. M. D.
{1978)
Aircraft Sales, Inc., C.A.3d, 575 F.2d 1086
{1978); see also Malone v. White Motor Corp.,
435 U.S. 497, 98 s.ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443
{19 7 8 ) • { FN 5 )
FN5. Cessna Finance relies on Dowell v. Beech
Acceptance Corp., Inc., 3 Cal.3d 544, 91
Cal.Rptr. 1, 476 P.2d 401 {1970), cert.
denied, 404 u.s. 823, 92 s.ct.
45, 30
L.Ed.2d 50 {1971) for the proposition that,
because of the federal preemption of the
priority issue, a buyer in the ordinary course
of business from a retail dealer does not
take free of a prior federally recorded
security interest created by that dealer.
This is the Only case to so hold. Sigman, The
Wild Blue Yonder: Interests in Aircraft Under
Our Federal System, 46 So.Cal.L.Rev. 316,
339-348 {1973). Because it misapprehends the
Act's legislative history and misapplies the
standards for application of the preemption
doctrine, we choose to allow it to remain one
of a kind.
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And the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Bank of Hendersonville
analyzes the issue as follows:
California appears to stand alone in its
insistence that a customer who buys an
airplane out of the stock of a dealer must
carry out a ''title search'' for recorded
''floor plan'' liens.
This Court prefers to follow the rule
announced in all other jurisdictions that the
rights of a purchaser from a dealer in ordinary course of business are superior to the
holder of a lien upon a moving stock of planes
in the hands of a dealer. There are a number
of reasons why this decision is preferable.
1. The Uniform Commercial Code has brought
uniformity and order to the field of commercial law. To graft a new class of exceptions
upon the existing uniform law would reverse
the wholesome intent and result of the law.
2. It is not reasonable to assume that
Congress intended any such result where
clearly stated.

not

3. The proliferation of aircraft dealerships
and aircraft purchases would be seriously
hampered if the public were not allowed to
trust dealers selling in ordinary course of
business.
4. It is inequitable and unjust to allow a
mortgagee to hold ''secret liens'' on chattels while authorizing the chattels to be
exhibited for sale by a dealer to the deception and loss of the purchasing public.
5. Lienholders may protect themselves (if they
desire) by impounding the mortgaged planes in
locked surroundings inconsistent with the
free-sale situation of a stock of
merchandise.
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These cases are well reasoned and should be followed by the
court in the instant case.
POINT II
RESPONDENT RECEIVED GOOD TITLE ON THE DATE OF PURCHASE AND
THE SELLERS' WARRANTY OF TITLE WAS NOT BREACHED.
Respondent fails to note in his brief that on
October 17, 1977, the date of purchase, {Trial Court's
Finding No. l} the date on which title was to pass, {Trial
Court's Finding No. 2} there were no title documents on file
with the FAA whatsoever (Trial Court's Finding No. 3}.

The

Federal Aviation Act specifically provides that "no conveyance or instrument, the recording of which is provided
for by subsection {a} of this section shall be valid. • •
against any person other than the person by whom the conveyance or other instrument is made or given, his heir or
devisee, or any person having actual notice thereof, until
such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation
in the office of the Secretary of Transportation."
U.S.C.

Section 1403 {c}.

49

The Uniform Commercial Code pro-

vides that title to goods passes when agreed upon by the
parties or upon delivery.

In this case the result is the

same whether you rely upon paragraph 5 of the Purchase
Agreement or whether you rely upon Section 2-401{2} of the
Uniform commercial Code.

In either event title to the

aircraft passed to the Respondent not later than the date of
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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delivery, October 20, 1977, {TR. 16-17).

No documents

affecting that title were on file with the F.A.A. prior to
October 25, 1977.

(Trial Courts Finding No. 3).

Therefore,

by the very language of the Federal Aviation Act quoted
above, even assuming it preempts state law on the issue of
prioritie~,

the Trial Court was in error.

The only claimed defect in the respondent buyer's
title is two Security Agreements executed by Skyways to
Cessna Finance Corporation and subsequently by Transwest to
Cessna Finance Corporation for the sole specific purpose of
facilitating the transfer of title to the buyer respondent.
(TR.51-54).

The last of these two security interests was

released on November 21, 1977 (Trial Court's Finding No. 3),
only 31 days after respondent took delivery of the aircraft.
It was not until some fourteen months later that respondent
notified appellant of his wish to rescind the contract.

On

the date that respondent took delivery of the aircraft,
October 20, 1977, the appellant Flight School had perfeet unencumbered title to the same.

This conclusion is

inescapable when analyzed in light of Section 9-307(1) of
the Uniform Commercial Code {70a-9-307(1) U.C.A.) which provides as follows:
A buyer in ordinary course of business
(subsection (9) of Section 1-201) other than a
person buying farm products from a person
-6-
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engaged in farming operations takes free of a
security interest created by his seller even
though the security interest is perfected and
even though the buyer knows of its existence.
When Skyways purchased the aircraft from Cessna, Skyways
executed a security agreement to Cessna Finance Corporation
and at that point in time Skyways clearly did not have unencumbered title.

However, when Skyways sold the aircraft to

Transwest, Transwest being a buyer in ordinary course of
business took free of the security interest created by
Skyways.

In turn Transwest financed the aircraft by exe-

cuting a security agreement to Cessna Finance Corporation.
Transwest then did not have unencumbered title.

However,

when Transwest sold the aircraft to the appellant Flight
School in the ordinary course of business the Flight School
took free of the security interest created by its seller
Transwest.

Pursuant to Section 9-307 u.c.c. this result

would obtain even though the security interest had been (and
it was not) filed with the FAA and even though the Flight
School might have known (although there is no evidence in
the record to so indicate) of the existence of either of the
prior security agreements.

Thus, appellant Flight School

had good unencumbered title to the aircraft which it subsequently transferred to the respondent.

That this transfer

was "rightful" within the meaning of Section 2-312 of the
Uniform commercial Code is self evident because it was
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Cessna itself who made delivery to the Flight School's
buyer, the respondent herein.
This result seems imminently clear and perpetuates
the intent of the Uniform Commercial Code that a buyer in
the ordinary course of business buying inventory from a
dealer take free and clear of any security interest or
encumbrance unknown to him.

Such a result facilitates the

intent of the Uniform Commercial Code to encourage the free
flow of goods and to protect the unsuspecting consumer
against encumberances held by commercial interests who are
better able to protect themselves in such a setting.
This result is further mandated by Section 2-403
of the Uniform Commercial Code (Section 9-2-403 Utah Code
Annotated) which provides as follows:
(1) A purchaser of goods acquires all title
which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited
interest acquires rights only to the extent
of the interest purchased. A person with
voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value.
When goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase the purchaser has such
power even though
(a) the transferor was deceived as to
the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a
check which is later dishonored, or
(c} it was agreed that the transaction
was to be a "cash sale," or
-8-
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{d} the delivery was procured through
fraud punishable as larcenous under
the criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a
merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives
him power to transfer all rights of the
entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of
business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any
acquiescence in retention of possession
regardless of any condition expressed between
the parties to the delivery or acquiescence
and regardless of whether the procurement of
the entrusting or the possessor's disposition
of the goods have been such as to be larcenous
under the criminal law.
(4) The rights of other purchasers of goods
and of lien creditors are governed by the
chapters on Secured Transactions {chapter 9),
Bulk Transfers {chapter 6) and Documents of
Title {chapter 7).
{Emphasis Added.}
In this case Cessna entrusted the aircraft through its chain
of dealers to The Flight School and indeed made delivery
directly to the Flight School's buyer, respondent Johnston.
To hold that there was defect in Johnston's title as a
result of the two security interests put in place solely for
the purpose of faciltating the transfer of that title to
Johnston is a ludicrous and inequitable result.
Respondent Johnston's real and only concern
throughout this entire transaction was the delay experienced
in obtaining a certificate of registration from the FAA.
There are three problems, however, in Johnston's reliance
upon these delays in attempting to rescind the contract.
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First, the delays were completely beyond the control of the
appellant and any finding to the contrary is totally
without support in the record.

The respondent's own

witness, Mr. Gene Battachio, owner of Transwest Aircraft
Sales testified as to the difficulty experienced in this
particular case.

He related other experiences he was per-

sonally familiar with and testified it was not unusual to
experience substantial delays in obtaining certificates of
registration from the FAA.

(TR.

54-57).

Secondly, the certificate of registration is not a
title document and does not evidence ownership.

u.s.c

See 49

Section 140l(f) which provides:
Registration shall not be evidence of
ownership of aircraft in any proceeding in
which such ownership by a particular person
is, or may be, in issue.
Finally, plaintiff Johnston has failed to plead any

breach of the contract of sale based upon the delay in
receiving the certificate of registration and has plead only
that appellant Flight School breached its warranty by
failing to convey good unencumbered title to respondent
Johnston.

The issue of the delays in obtaining a cer-

tificate of registration were never properly before the
court and counsel for appellant Flight School continually
objected throughout the trial to any evidence concerning
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such delays.

See counsel's opening statement and numerous

objections throughout the transcript.
CONCLUSION
This is an equitable action seeking rescission of a
contract for the sale of an aircraft commenced 15 months
after plaintiff took delivery of that aircraft.

To permit

such a rescission on the ill-founded theories of respondent
and the court below not only results in a grossly inequitable
result in this particular case but also reeks havoc in
the real commercial world of the aircraft industry.

This

court is urged to reverse the lower court and hold as a
matter of law that the warranty of title was not breached.
DATED this 9th day of October, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,

rank s. Warner
WARNER, MARQUARDT & HASENYAGER
Attorney for Defendants,
Appellants.
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